Aircraft Carrier FAQs

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IJN Carrier Deck Hinomaru *PIC*

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <LRAJIM@aol.com>

Date: Tuesday, 15 August 2000, at 4:44 a.m.

 

I have followed with great interest the postings on this board regarding the carrier deck markings as applied to the various IJN CVs. Of particular interest was the discussion regarding the markings of the CV HIRYU at the battle of Midway.

There are two excellent, full-page, color sketches done in 1942 by a photographer and artist who served aboard the HIRYU in Koku Fan Illustrated No.109 on pages 49 and 51. It is clear from the sketches that the hinomaru was applied to the forward deck of the HIRYU with a white outline and that the two "runway" demarcation lines, in white, passed through the hinomaru.

I do not have my source immediatedly available, but I do recall reading somewhere, that the Japanese began to apply the hinomaru to the flight decks of the carriers shortly after the Battle of the Coral Sea. As I recall, in one instance, some Japanese aircraft mistook one of the American carriers for Japanese and even attepted to make a landing aboard one in the twilight of the evening!

From the photographs and contemporary art work I have seen, it would appear that all four carriers at Midway had the hinomaru on the forward deck. I will have to research this further, but it seems to me that the lead carrier (or flagship) of each division may have carried the hinomaru with a circular outline and the second ship had it applied to a square background (or was it the other way around?). Of course this, for the moment, is pure speculation on my part.

I have seen no evidence that the SHOKAKU or ZUIKAKU ever carried such markings. I would be interested to know if there is any evidence that the RYUJO and JUNYO carried such markings at the time of their attack on Dutch Harbor.

Editors Note: The photo is not reproduced here.

 

Rising sun on IJN carriers

Posted By: Gus Villanueva <GUSDOCVILL@aol.com>

Date: Saturday, 29 July 2000, at 7:49 p.m.

 

Can someone please help me establish just which carriers had the rising sun on their forward fligh decks!!!

Recently obtained the AJ Press of AKAGI and I was quite shocked to see her rising sun on a white background!!

Recently read a book on the Battle of Midway Island and found two references in which the HIRYU had a rising sun on her flight!!!

I thought only the AKAGI and KAGA had the rising sun.

Any one have colored pictures of any of the four Midway carriers? I have an old 486 computer and Epson 3250 printer. All that to state that my system cannot print up clear pictures. If you have pictures, could I talk you into mailing them to me!?

Anyone confirm data that the TONE was 29 feet longer than the CHIKUMA?

Anyone have info on the dates the mainmast was moved aft on the TAKAO and ATAGO?

Trying to build the major combatants of the IJN at the Battle of Midway Island. Would sincerely appreicate any and all help.

 

Re: Rising sun on IJN carriers

Posted By: Frido Kip <frido.kip@hetnet.nl>

Date: Sunday, 30 July 2000, at 2:35 a.m.

In Response To: Rising sun on IJN carriers (Gus Villanueva)

 

I have pictures of Akagi, Sôryû and Hiryû at Midway that proves that these three carriers had Hinomarus on their forward flight decks, confirming the statements made by the others. Akagi and Sôryû definitely had white bands as shown in the AJ booklet, but Hiryû had only a white circle around her red ball. Please check out the Kaga find discussion below, there is a nice colour drawing of Kaga there, showing the Hinomaru on the flight deck: http://www.combinedfleet.com/Midwayfind.htm

Tone had the same length as Chikuma according to Lacroix and Wells II, both measuring 201.60m (661ft 4in) overall and 198.75m (652ft 1in) at the waterline when completed.

Lacroix is also the best source for your other question. Takao was modified from May 1938 to 31 August 1939 and Atago from April 1938 to 30 October 1939, emerging from these refits with their masts placed approximately 25m further aft. This specific change was carried out to improve seaplane arrangements.

 

Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers *PIC*

Posted By: David_Aiken <David_Aiken@hotmail.com>

Date: Saturday, 29 July 2000, at 8:38 p.m.

In Response To: Rising sun on IJN carriers (Gus Villanueva)

 

Check out the US Naval Historical Center on photos of the ships in question at: "www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/jap-name.htm". They also have images from the battle: below is a nice shot of the Soryu ...in the midst of the Battle of Midway seen from a B-17... showing the meatball.

Editors Note: The photo is not reproduced here.

Link: http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/wwii-pac/midway/midway.htm

 

Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers

Posted By: Matthew Greer <Furher@uswest.net>

Date: Sunday, 30 July 2000, at 1:40 a.m.

In Response To: Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers *PIC* (David_Aiken)

 

I my self am also trying to model the IJN's Midway operation fleet only just prior to leaving home waters. I know of a website that can help you. Go check out John Parshalls web site entitled Nihon Kaigun or the Imperial Japanese fleet you can find it at www.combinedfleet.com/

He has a lot of good links, and also if you write him with your question he will probally send you the info you are looking for.

In my own experience I have decided to put the famous Japanese Meatball as some call it on the forward part of all my major fleet CV's "Soryu,Hiryu,Akagi,Kaga" as for the others like the Hosho and Zuiho I don't think that the japanese put the meatball or rising sun insigina on the deck of the two I just mentioned. Also if you want I can E-mail you some black and white photo's taken by B-17's at midway. I have a shot of the Soryu, Hiryu, and I belive I also have photos of the Kaga and Akagi.

 

Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 8:15 p.m.

In Response To: Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers (Matthew Greer)

 

I apprecaite Frido's referring to my site for the drawing of Kaga with the hinomaru. Of course, I had to get that base3 material from somewhere, and in this case I got it from a recent Gakken publication. Thus whole issue of which ship had what painted on them on 4 June is making me a little crazy. Here's my current take on this issue:

Akagi: There's a shot of Akagi under attack by B-17s on 4 June. I believe that this shot shows a red hinomaru, with a white outline around it. The longitudinal deck stripes do not appear to go through it. Further, I know from Mark Horan that one of Dick Best's pilots used the meatball as an aiming point.

Kaga: We ain't got jack squat for pictures of Kaga on 4 June (and the photographic record of her prior to that pretty much bites as well). The sole reason I put a hinomaru on her bow was because I have a recent Gakken publication that has a nice illustration of her that shows a red hinomaru with a white border, as well as a kana "ka" symbol on the port fantail. That illustration is my sole reason for putting a red hinomaru on my own drawing, unless the American aviators have specific recollections about her insignia when they were whapping her.

Soryu: That B-17 shot, I think, very much substantiates the idea of her carrying the red hinomaru with a white border. The logintudinal lines do not go through it, and the color of it appears slightly darker than the rest of the flight deck, which was a lightish wood color. So I am betting we have a red hinomaru there. I can't tell if she had a kana symbol on her port quarter or not. My Japanese drawings don't show it, but they're in conflict on other minor details.

Hiryu: There's another B-17 shot of Hiryu under attack, and it is clear there is a white circular outline on her foredeck. However, the white deck stripes clearly go through this circle, which leads me to think that she alone of the four carriers did *not* have a red meatball on her flight deck. This pic also shows the "hi" kana symbol on her deck aft, which makes me suspect that Soryu had one, too, but I just don't know.

Folks, I am *wide open* to more and/or better information on this topic, as it would aid my illustrations greatly. The Japanese clearly changed their deck painting schemes for these ships at least twice, and the drawings I have in my books are often very vague as to what date they are portraying.

 

Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers

Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <kinson-garments@on.aibn.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 9:54 p.m.

In Response To: Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers (Jon Parshall)

 

I believe that there was a good chance that all four carriers at the Battle of Midway had Japanese insignia painted on their flight decks, because during the same time period, many other IJN warships carried hinomarus on places such as decks(eg. seaplane tender Chitose), turrets(eg. cruiser Mikuma, battleship Hiei), and conning towers(eg. submarines). It seems that during this time period, many IJN ships carried hinomarus for ID purposes.

Incidentally, the artist who drew the Kaga in the Gakken book admits that the hinomaru on the Kaga was pure speculation, based on the fact that the photos of the carriers Akagi and Hiryu shows hinomarus on their decks( for some reason, he doesn't mention the Soryu) . Also, he says that an eyewitness states that the hinomarus were painted on the flight decks of all four carriers three days before leaving the home waters.

 

Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers *PIC*

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 7:46 a.m.

In Response To: Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers (Tennessee Katsuta)

 

Interesting, because I think this photo of Hiryu throws some doubt on that claim. You can see that at least one deck stripe goes through the circular area on the bow, and that's something that would have disrupted the emblem, and that does not appear on the Akagi and Soryu. Furthermore, it may just be the angle, but I don't detect a difference in color between this area of the flight deck and the rest of the deck. Nitpicky, I know, but there it is. On the other hand, if you have a survivor's account that all four of them carried the emblem... I dunno.

Editors Note: The photo is not reproduced here.

 

Re: Hiryu - probably not

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 8:20 a.m.

In Response To: Re: web site:Rising sun on IJN carriers *PIC* (Jon Parshall)

 

I do not pretend to be the expert on anything to do with colors of Japanese aircraft or ships. However, I do have a wealth of first hand information on the USN, USMC, and USAAC aircrews and aircraft that flew at Midway.

In regard to the painting of hinomaru on the flight decks of the four Japanese carriers at Midway, teh first hand accounts of the attacking aviators should be able to shed some light on the topic. In the case of the three carriers bombed in the morning attack, the attacking USN aviators all mention seeing the red "meatball" boldly painted on the otherwise bright wooden decks, and in each case at least one pilot used this "meatball" as his aiming point during the dive, centering it in the telescope most of the way down.

However, this first hand evidence is entirely absent from any of the aircrews involved in the afternoon attack on Hiryu - not a single one mentioned one on her deck.

Is this conclusive - certainly not - but it is fairly interesting evidence.

 

Re: Hiryu - probably not *PIC*

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 8:56 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu - probably not (Mark E. Horan)

 

As Jon has said, we have been puzzling over this for a while ourselves. Mark's point about the aviators bombing Hiryu is striking---if the circle did not have a "meatball" or solid red painting in it, it would explain why the pilots didn't mention it. In this case, photo and written evidence would agree. Still, the circle itself is pretty visible close, but the pilots would not have been using it as aiming point if it is "hollow". The best indications for Kaga in photographs taken April '41 DO NOT show a meatball forward. They show a `hollow' white circle AFT, and that appears all. Go check out the photo at our announcement page with Kaga pics at http://www.combinedfleet.com/MidwayFind.htm

A related question is did SHOKAKU and ZUIKAKU have hiromaru's at Coral Sea? Perhaps they can shed light?

Editors Note: The photo is not reproduced here.

 

Re: Hiryu - probably not

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 8:56 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu - probably not (Mark E. Horan)

 

That is indeed an interesting little tidbit. It's a damn shame for us the purposes of this discussion that we clobbered the front end of Hiryu as badly as we did, I s'pose. Then again, she had it coming, hanging around in the area with her shot-up airgroup.

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 10:57 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu - probably not (Jon Parshall)

 

It is possible to see both sides of virtually every controversy (and there are a lot of them) that effected Kido Butai that fateful day, with the exception of this one.

Not only was it illogical for to continue the fight with only 9 strike planes (even after the success of Tomanaga's strike), the part that never made any sense is the fact that Hiryu continued to close with the US Carrier Task Forces and their three identified carriers, while preparing the dusk strike. I can't imagine what the Japanese were expecting to gain by closing on the enemy that was already well within range when Hiryu was, as yet, totally unprepared to strike. Of all the Midway decisions, this one is just absurd.

The only possible mitigating factor, small that it is, is that while Kido Butai represented the cream of Japanese Naval aviation, by all accounts Hiryu's air group was considered the best of the best (and showed it that day).

In this case, as in many others later on in the war, the Japanese way of life evidently prevented them from seeing the proper course of action which would, of course, have been to regroup for the morrow. Clearly, the US carriers had suffered staggering air losses. Had Hiryu retired on Zuiho, making conscious effort to recover the zeros orbitting the other three carriers on the way, the combined force could easily have covered the fleet while waiting for Junyo and Ryujo to arrive.

Thereafter, had Yamamoto decided to continue he wouldn't have been much worse off than he was, in reality, on the morning of 4 June. The US would have added Saratoga and her hastily thrown together air group, to the two tired Air Groups of TF-16, which had added but a few replacement SBDs (and the last 5 operational TBDs in the Pacific) and VT-8 Detachment's 10 TBFs. Given that situation, the combined striking power of Hiryu, Junyo, Ryujo, and Zuiho was not all that far behind.

Tactically, the better move would have been to shuttle Zuiho's kanko to Hiryu, leaving her to provife fighter dover for the transports, but that would have constituted a very un-Japanese action. All in all, an interesting what if.

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 11:49 a.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Mark E. Horan)

 

I think it's generally dangerous to type-cast decisions based on national characteristics, but this one really *is* hard to figure out. Having lived in Japan, I think it's safe to say that the Japanese often view problems from a different perspective than we do, and that leads to different styles in combat. Still, both sides could do grade-school arithmetic, and it should have been clear that Hiryu was in no position to pull off an alpha strike against anything more formidable than a container ship. In the absence of true offensive capability, preservation of the platform should have taken precedence while there was still time to do so. I think, however, in Japan there is more of an acceptance of the nobility of failure while giving it one's best effort. In America I think the tendency is to say, "Well, you won this one, but I'll be back." Best effort be damned; we wanna win, and if we can't win today then we'll put ourselves in a position to win tomorrow.

I think this is part of the enduring fascination of this particular navy for me; they drive me utterly crazy because I just don't understand why they did a lot of the things they did. I mean, Yamaguchi is still extolled in contemporary Japanese publications, and is mentioned as the guy who would have been next C-in-C of Combined Fleet. Yet his performance in this battle, while injecting a needed element of aggressiveness, perhaps, strayed well over the line of prudence and into the realm of self-immolation. If Japan was to win this war, aggressiveness had to be tempered with savviness, and preservation of capital (material assets, people, initiative, and time) needed to be uppermost in the minds of Japanese commanders. Yet here we have a commander who is next in line for the most important position in the navy, yet who apparently had no grasp of the strategic realities of the conflict as a whole, and was incapable of placing his tactical decisions within the larger framework of national combat. If this was the general caliber of strategic thought on Japan's side (and I think it was), it's hard to hold out much hope for them when pitted against a foe as powerful as the United States. Somebody once said, "Tactical and operational errors can be corrected; strategic errors live forever." Sic semper idiots.

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <kinson-garments@on.aibn.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 9:18 p.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Jon Parshall)

 

To understand why the Japanese Navy fought the way did, you must understand the mentality of the Japanese at the time. Being a Japanese Canadian, I think I have some understanding of what went through the minds of the Japanese.

By in large, the Japanese military would like to consider themselves as modern equivalent of the samurai warriors. The warriors were bound by the Bushido, or the Samurai code. The samurai code glorified beliefs such as fighting to the last man, die before surrendering, never turn your back to the enemy,etc. etc.(I hope you get the picture).

I believe Yamaguchi was bound by this belief. It's ironic that his name Tamon was named after a famous Japanese warlord who proved his loyalty to the Japanese Emperor at the time by fighting a hopeless battle to his death. The warlord died but occupied his place in Japanese history as a warrior who served as a role model not only to samurai/warrior class, but to the Japanese in general. Of course, political propaganda also played a significant role.

Just like the warlord, Yamaguchi was killed in action, but left a lasting impression not only among the Japanese Navy personnel, but to the Japanese historians in general. Sure, what he did wasn't strategically sound, but the Japanese love men like him. What can I say, it's probably ingrained in thier genes because throughout Japanese history, men like Yamaguchi has been glorified and idolized. Even the way he died, waiting for his death aboard the sinking Hiryu accompanied by Captain Kaku, is so poetic.

I agree, Japanese Navy lacked the strategic mind to fight the war of such grand scale. The only person who came close to it was probably Yamamoto. They were so caught up in what lied immediately ahead of them and failed to see beyond that. They were in so much hurry to die prematurely. It wasn't the best thing, but unfortunately, that was just the way they were.

 

Hiryu theory

Posted By: John R <jpredman@nationwideisp.net>

Date: Thursday, 17 August 2000, at 2:55 a.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Tennessee Katsuta)

 

Belatedly chucking in my 2 cents worth:

Is it possible that the reason Hiryu got her foredeck blown off is that the US pilots were aiming at, and in fact hit, a hinomaru painted there? Kinda sorta?

Also, where did I read (the web? one of the many book on the IJN I've accumulated?) that the hinomaru was not painted, but made up of pieces of painted canvas tacked to the deck, which could be moved around?

Sounds like a fire hazard to me, but if true, it could mean the hinomaru "came and went" on the same ship on the same day!

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Thursday, 17 August 2000, at 11:43 a.m.

In Response To: Hiryu theory (John R)

 

In reference to your first paragraph, while that would, of course, be possible, it would seem to be unlikely.

As part of my research on the air actions at Midway, I interviewed many USN aviators that dove on Kido Butai's carriers on 4 June. Almost without exception, they mention the plainly visible "meatballs" being used as aiming points in the dives on all three carriers hit on the morning attack mission. Likewise, not a single one mentioned such during the dive on Hiryu. While I have to be honest, such details as this and zero colors and markings were NOT a prime goal of my research (sorry, who knew it was that important), it is, I believe, a weighty (non) statement on the issue.

All the aircew commented on the BRIGHT "yellow/tan" decks on all the carriers, and were amazed in the AM attack by the audacity the Japanese had in placing BRIGHT red "meatballs" on these decks that made perfect aiming points. If that circle on the foredeck of Hiryu is, in fact, a red filled hinomaru, it must have been considerably duller in color than those on the other three carriers, as nobody commented on it at all (even though the white stands out clear enough).

In the attacks on Akagi it was the aiming point for Ed Kroeger. On Soryu and Kaga, it was the initial aiming point for several pilots, even some well back in the formation, until it was smothered in flames.

During the Hiryu attack, both sides agree the first three bombs definitely missed. This means that at least the first four planes had a clear deck to aim at, and at least the first six, all of VB-6, had a clear view at least partway down.

Plane 1, S-1 Gallaher & Merritt: I did not interview Gallaher, but Lord, Barde, and Cressman did, all of which I have had access to. He never mentioned a "meatball" in the PM, but did in the AM. Merritt steadfastly (and uniquely) refused all interviews.

Plane 2, S-2 Stone & Bergin: Stone died and I never was able to trace Bergin or his fate. Had access to a brief description of the attack made by Stone, but not detailed enough to know what he saw.

Plane 3, S-18 Dexter & Hoff: Dexter was lost on 20 July 1942. Had extensive chats with Hoff, he did not note any "meatball, but on the PM flight he was "distracted" by the need to fight off the Zeros

Plane 4, S-7 Kleiss & Snowden: Had extensive correspondence with both, who were very clear on all aspects of the attacks. Kleiss got the second hit on Kaga, and the first on Hiryu. Her aimed at the "meatball" on Kaga. Never mentioned one on Hiryu. Snowden noted the bomb hitting the "meatball" on Kaga. He never mentioned seeing one on Hiryu.

Plane 5, S-11 Jaccard & Pixley: Jaccard was lost with Wasp on 15 September 1942. To my everlasting sadness, I tracked down Pixley one week after he died.

Plane 6, S-17 Micheel & Dance: Had extensive conversation with Micheel. Noted the "meatball" on Kaga even though he was well back in the formation. Never mentioned one on Hiryu. I never traced Dance or his fate.

The next group to dive was VB-3. No one mentioned a "meatball", though Kleiss' hit may could have erased it by then if there was one.

Best and his wingman, Ed Kroeger of VB-6 dove last (though that was not the plan). By then the fore ship was ablaze, and they had been well distracted prior to that, so cannot help, though Kroeger (and Best) were sure that Best's bomb hit.

Is this the final word - certainly not - but maybe it helps.

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: John R <jpredman@nationwideisp.net>

Date: Thursday, 17 August 2000, at 12:19 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu theory (Mark E. Horan)

 

Thanks for a staggeringly detailed response! I tend to agree - if there'd been a hinomaru there, you'd expect it to have been commented on, given that the others were commented on. And of course an IJN pilot looking for his ship would readily recognise Hiryu as a result - she'd be the one with a port-side island, but without a hinomaru.

One day I may build my 1:700 Hiryu so it's nice to know I'm getting this stuff right.

I notice that several books (notably the Polish title)indicate a red and white stripe effect on the extreme stern part of the flight deck of Akagi, and other carriers besides. Is that a documented feature also? Does it serve any purpose other than recognition? Were the grey deck bits steel, or concrete as Skulski says of Yamato?

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: Frido Kip <frido.kip@hetnet.nl>

Date: Thursday, 17 August 2000, at 1:52 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu theory (John R)

 

The red and white stripe effect was used by many Japanese carriers to assist their pilots in landing, who had to land without the help of a batsman. I don't know its actual purpose, maybe it was just an indication what the aft end of the flight deck was (and where the upward curve of the flight deck ended?).

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Friday, 18 August 2000, at 12:58 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu theory (Frido Kip)

 

That's exactly what it was for. Bear in mind that as the pilot is guiding his plane in, at a certain point the nose of the aircraft is going to obscure his view of the flight deck. the red and white paint helped indicate the end of the flight deck, and this pattern was extended to the deck edges to help him see. In fact, the reason the Japanese carriers had those rectangular or trapezoidal outriggers on either side of the flight deck was strictly for orientation purposes, *not* for an LSO (they didn't use them).

I am finding this Hiryu hinomaru debate very interesting. On the one had we have a recollection from a survivor who was on the ship who says that the hinomaru was there, and painted it in some detail that also roughly corresponds with the photographs taken of Hiryu in the morning. On the other hand we have a *ton* of pilots all notable for their lack of commentary. Is it possible that since these pilots had all participated in the morning attacks, and had seen the Japanses color schemes, that the presence of a hinomaru was no longer worthy of comment? Are *any* of these guys still left around to talk to? Dick Best is, I guess. Any others?

Given those paintings Jim Lansdale put up, I am beginning to lean back towards Hiryu having a hinomaru.

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: Frido Kip <frido.kip@hetnet.nl>

Date: Saturday, 19 August 2000, at 2:25 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Hiryu theory (Jon Parshall)

 

Finally somebody who confirms my suspected reason for the strange outriggers. You have no idea how long I've been looking for this confirmation.

By the way, for those who are interested, the Japanese also used a light system to help the pilots land their planes, consisting of red and green lamps which told them if they were too high or low in their approach.

 

Re: Hiryu theory

Posted By: James F. Lansdale <LRAJIM@aol.com>

Date: Thursday, 17 August 2000, at 4:34 a.m.

In Response To: Hiryu theory (John R)

 

You write, "the hinomaru was not painted, but made up of pieces of painted canvas tacked to the deck, which could be moved around?"

Actually many IJN ships, particularly cruisers and submarines had large canvas flags which they would cleat to one of the forward main gun turrents (in the case of capital ships) or to the conning tower of the subs for purposes of IFF. I do not recall that any mention has been made in the literature that this occurred on carriers, but it is logical that this may have been done on occasion.

Regarding the forward deck hinomaru on the CV HIRYU: There are two paintings done in 1942 by a member of her crew which show the red hinomaru surrounded by a white outline and with two runway stripes through it on the forward deck in Model Art No.109 p.p.49 and 51.

Interestingly, two aerial views of IJN seaplane tenders operating in the Solomons area during 1942-43 show hinomaru on their forward decks (AKITSUSHIMA and KAMIKAWA or KUNIKAWA-MARU). In the case of the Marus, the intire floor of the forward circular 5.9" gun deck was painted red with a white splinter shield!

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Adm. Gurita <agritter@inn.nl>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 4:51 p.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Tennessee Katsuta)

 

Yours really is a great posting, making many aspects of the typical Japanese view quite clear again. BTW I thank the other gentlemen in this line too. IJN is only one of many aspects of Japan, a country fascinating me anyway. A point to remember is that Japan never was colonized, so she could keep her own thinking (but I too agree that in the 1930's it became quite "overheated") and add Western weapons and colonies of her own; Westerners tend to overlook that colonization and preaching the Gospel taught many other non-Western nations to think along "our" lines. The book "The nobility of failure" by Ivan Morris can give the average gaijin a good start in trying to look with Japanese eyes - though on the other hand the Japanese themselves sometimes seem to prefer to think that no other nation really can understand them. Once I read that the defeat at Midway was less held to be Nagumo's responsibility than something "that just happened to him"; responsibility ideally is shared rather than borne by a single individual, which is hard for Westerners to understand, let alone accept, but of course serves to avoid the dreaded loss of face. Another good book, this time about modern Japan, is Van Wolferen's "The Enigma of Japanese Power". (I've got many more, but let me try to be moderate. If interested, mail me).

This samurai Tamon - is he Kusunoki Masashige?

Speaking of samurai, not always did they fight to the end. Toyotomi Hideyoshi preferred his opponents (e.g. the Shimazu of Kyushu) to surrender, so he could use them in his service. The Tokugawa continued this. (Of course both would fight if necessary). One would say those generals of old (Shingen, Kenshin, Ieyasu etc.) had a better overall strategic view than their 1940's colleagues...

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <kinson-garments@on.aibn.com>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 8:18 p.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Adm. Gurita)

 

Yes, the samurai is Kusunoki Masashige, and his childhood name was Tamonmaru. In the age when the 

Emperor was considered God in human form, Kusunoki was considered a great samurai for his loyalty to the emperor. Interesting fact is while he was loyal to the emperor to his death, many other warlords at the time were unreliable at best. They betrayed their superiors at any opportunities they got. This made Kusunoki's actions unique and admirable even more. Sorry to go off topic!

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 9:31 p.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Tennessee Katsuta)

 

Excellent and Insightful post, Tennessee! I agree with your take on Yamaguchi. It fits what I have learned 

about the Japanese in my studies. Even to the extent that yes, though irrational, part of me can identify with Yamaguchi's decisions. Its just not from a practical viewpoint.

I would be very interested to hear your opinion in similar fashion on the why of Kurita's decision to turn back at Samar? I have always maintained he was losing his forces, even his big ships, at a rate fast enough to justify calling off the attack and returning home. Militarily, it is sound. But for the reasons you explained, I find his willingness to not make the emotional decision all the more surprising. Was he just more practical, or what do you think?

 

Re: And How!

Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <kinson-garments@on.aibn.com>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 9:07 p.m.

In Response To: Re: And How! (Tony Tully)

 

Thanx for your complement, Tony.

Why did Kurita turn back? Isn't this a question asked by many historians for decades? Pondering over such question makes me humble, especially for a modeller-and-not-a-historian like me, but here it goes.

First of all, yes, Kurita was taking a tremendous beating from the U.S. carrier airplanes and losing many of his ships. He probably new that he should turn back to preserve his ships. On the other hand, he couldn't turn back until he can achieve his objective, which is to destroy the American transport ships off Leyte Gulf. He really couldn't turn back empty handed.

Then all of a sudden out of the blue, Kurita's fleet spotted the American escort carrier group. Kurita misidentified the enemy ships as Essex class carriers and ordered his men to persuit and destroy the enemy. This was sweet revenge for his ships which were battered by the US aircraft. Now is the pay back time!

The American fleet managed to escape beyond Kurita's fleet's range, but not before losing few escort carriers and destroyers. Kurita of course believed that they sunk fleet carriers.

They managed to sink a few carriers, but Kurita knew that there were more out there beyond their reach. He wasn't aware that Ozawa's decoy fleet succeeded in attracting Hulsey's carrier group. He needed to escape before the carriers out there somewhere started launching more air strikes against him.

He didn't achieve his objective of striking the American transport ships, but he's not turning back empty handed. He managed to sink a few (what he thought were) fleet carriers.

Thus he had an excuse to do what he wanted to do, which was to turn back his fleet. He was defeated, but managed to sink a few enemy ships.

Traditionally, IJN always preferred to fight capital ships over non-warships such as transports, no matter how important they were strategically. One may recall that in 1942, when Mikawa's fleet attacked the US forces off Guadalcanal and destroyed few cruisers, he left without firing a single shot against the transport. He clearly did not achieve the strategic goal, but IJN did not see this because they were satisfied with the sinking of US warships, and they also wanted to escape the enemy waters beyond the reach of US aircraft. Do you see the similarity between Kurita's and Mikawa's situations?

It seems that when a Japanese admiral makes a decision, it's based on their fear of enemy airforce, whether enemy warships were destroyed or not, (and not enemy transports), and lack of or wrong information. This all stems from lack of adequate air cover, poor strategic insight (like not seeing the importance of transport ships), and poor ability to gather information.

Going back to Yamaguchi, one reason he pressed on with his attack on US carriers is because he believed after Tomonaga's force crippled the Yorktown, there were only one US carrier left. After Kobayashi's force managed to hit the carrier with few bombs, and when Tomonaga's men did not see any signs of damage (the Americans' damage control ability was beyond the Japanese's imagination) on the carrier that they torpedoed, he believed that the carriers attacked by Kobayashi and Tomonaga were separate carriers. Therefore, he believed that two enemy carriers were either sunk or crippled and now they were down to one against one.

Thanx for reading all this. I know things were not as simple as this, but this is the best I can do.

 

Hinomaru Eyecandy *PIC*

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 9:31 a.m.

 

In Response To: Re: Hiryu - probably not (Jon Parshall)

For those who are interested, I am attaching my latest illustrations of the Kido Butai flight deck stripes and hinomaru puzzle.

Anybody got a if Soryu carried a "so" kana on her flight deck?

Editors Note: The picture is not reproduced here.

 

Re: Hinomaru Eyecandy

Posted By: Tennessee Katsuta <kinson-garments@on.aibn.com>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 9:28 p.m.

In Response To: Hinomaru Eyecandy *PIC* (Jon Parshall)

 

IF Soryu had a kana symbol on her flight deck, it would have been the katakana "SA" and not "SO." Back then, Soryu was actually written "SA-U-RI-YU-U", but PRONOUNCED "Soryu." For some reason, back then many Japanese words were not written the way they were pronounced. This changed shortly after the end of the war. I'm no linguist, so please don't ask me why. It's just the way it was.

 

Posted By: David_Aiken <David_Aiken@hotmail.com>

Date: Thursday, 27 July 2000, at 11:09 a.m.

 

The recent find of the CV Kaga gives hope that aircraft blown from the decks may survive from the carriers. The ones from CV Hiryu may then solve a question for many modelers:

The "tail code swap" question came up several times on this board. For the uninitiated, the question of what were the tail codes for the Second Carrier Division [Hiryu/Soryu] at Midway raised its head. When Admiral Yamaguchi changed his flagship about 24 April 1942, from Soryu to Hiryu, did the tail codes change to reflect this?

We all know the photography at Pearl Harbor and in the preparation for the Indian Ocean action shows Soryu with the tail code "BI" and Hiryu with "BII" [or in select cases: B11]. However, Midway has been in question.

John Lundstrom in his beautiful books has noted the tail code for the Hiryu KATE leader at Midway, Lt Tomonaga, as "BI-310".

Tennessee has translated a partial solution to the sources for this puzzle from "Hiryu and Her Aircraft" by H. Yoshimura, Model Art in July 1984, page 92:

1. Mr. Masaru Mimura, maintenance crewman from Soryu, recalls repainting the tail codes from BI to BII while they were at Yokosuka prior to the Battle of Midway.

2. Mr Juzo Mori, who flew a KATE from Soryu, recalls the tail codes for Hiryu and Soryu being BI and BII respectively during the Battle of Midway.

3. Mr "M.M." who was maintenance crewman for KATEs aboard the Hiryu recalls altering the tail codes on a few occasions.

4. Mr "N.K." who was a maintenance crewman for VALs stated that tail codes and fuselage bands were altered whenever the mother ship's position in the fleet was altered. There fore, before the Battle of Midway, the tail codes of Hiryu and Soryu were swapped. Usually the process of repainting the tail codes and fuselage band were done over a span of 2 to 3 days.

5. Historian I. Hata states Lt Tomonaga's tail code as BI-310 in his book.

There were a few more circumstancial evidences given but Tennessee did not translate these.

There is no documents found to date [or known to me] to support these witnesses so the opposing view has weight to say, al la THE BLUE MAX: "no confirmation, no kill". I am quite open to this stance as well. While in the military Uncle Sam, however, told me never to spread rumors as 90% of them are true. Thus we need some official responce from Boeicho beyond the single document [thankfully recovered and beautifully quoted by Allan Alsleben] to confirm/deny this action.

Both Allan, Tennessee, and I await a resolve from our friends across that big pond (aka: Pacific Ocean).

 

Re: "Hiryu and Her Aircraft"

Posted By: Matthew Greer <Furher@uswest.net>

Date: Saturday, 29 July 2000, at 2:16 a.m.

In Response To: "Hiryu and Her Aircraft" (David_Aiken)

 

Thanks for the interesting information I my self model 1/700 scale IJN ships I doubt that I will be putting 

any markings on the tails of my aircraft as it would be to little to be noticed. But being a big luftwaffe nut and an Axis powers nut in general I find this kind of info very interesting and very helpful in my understanding of the IJN fleet. Consaquentially I my self am trying to model the IJN fleet stationed at Hashirajima anchorage {semi-fictious} just prior to Midway, or Operation "MI".

 

Kaga Find

Posted By: Steve Athanas <knife59@bellsouth.net>

Date: Wednesday, 26 July 2000, at 8:18 p.m.

 

Looking at the info on the Kaga link, it appears bomb hit #1 separated the pictured wreckage from the main hull as the two were in very close proximity. Assuming this, the wreckage position would be where Kaga suffered its initial attack. Question for any sailors out there: as the ship sank approx. nine hours after that attack, how far would she drift in that time?

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Thursday, 27 July 2000, at 9:39 p.m.

In Response To: Kaga Find (Steve Athanas)

 

Ok Steve, going out on a limb here, but I would say she sank 5.18 miles from where she was hit. The currents in the area are approximately .5 knots south-southwest. 1 knot is 6,076.11549 feet, divide by 2, times 9 hours, divide by 5,280 feet. She could have drifted another .25 or .5 mile after leaving the surface before hitting the bottom. You should start a pool to see who gets the closest.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Randy <r.stone.eal@juno.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 9:46 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Scott Scarborough)

 

I doubt the vessel would weathervane much. If anything, the easterly wind, if it existed at

all, would subtract from the oceanic drift to some extent. In other words, the ship would be a bit to the north of the drift. I also got on Scott about the five decimal figures and the fact that we sailors are using but 6000 feet to a nautical mile. Still the difference (or error, if you will) would be within half the length of the vessel. I suggested an expanding box search biased in favor of drift to a rectangular shape. But the major error is the original coordinates of her sinking. Yorktown was difficult and they had very good coordinates...one can only imagine the problems inherent in finding A, K, H & S. I do wonder when magnetometers will be integrated with such searches.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Steve Athanas <knife59@bellsouth.net>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 12:46 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Randy)

 

Thanks for the info, Randy. I've always wondered about the so-called "sinking coordinates," curious as to how they're determined. Having never been a sailor (I was a fly boy), I don't know how often a particular ship shot the sun to know its position at any particular moment. I think the fact that Kaga's sinking position is noted in Morison to the tenth of a minute of lat/long is interesting.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Randy <r.stone.eal@juno.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 1:51 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Steve Athanas)

 

Hi Steve: I was a sailor, now I am a flyboy; but, interestingly enough, I have taken up sailing again. Anyway, combat losses are notoriously inaccurate regarding position and for various reasons. Add in the invisibility of the sea and it is the proverbial needle in the haystack routine. BTW, unless I missed something Scott's figures are right on, but as I mentioned the error involved is substantially less than the length of the ship even if drift speed, time and wind are substantially different than has been postulated.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Steve Athanas <knife59@bellsouth.net>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 5:40 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Scott Scarborough)

 

Thanks for the sailor's estimate, Scott. I was looking through Morison and noted an easterly wind at the time. Would this have a significant effect or would a drifting (powerless) ship weathervane into the wind and minimize drift due to it?

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 5:01 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Steve Athanas)

 

Randy be patient here. Steve I beleive that if the wind was blowing against Kagas hull dead on at 90 degrees, it would be possible that she would have been blown sideways (air pressure being equal at both ends of the ship, making her drift at a faster rate. If the wind blew more at one end or the other then she could have turned into the wind easily, well at least depending on the speed of the wind. She would have drifted at a slower speed with little hull surface exposed to the wind.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Randy <r.stone.eal@juno.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 5:32 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Scott Scarborough)

 

Scott & Steve: Please help me here. If the current is 0.5 knots SSW and the wind is easterly and assuming any component of drift due to wind, would not Kaga be at least to the north of her oceanic drift (without wind)? And, incidentally, what was Kaga's heading after her power failed, anyone care to hazard a guess?

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 10:25 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Randy)

 

Randy, Nagumos after action report stated that the carriers were heading 70 degrees, with a course change to 30 degrees when attacked by American torpedo bombers. The carriers were 1300 yards apart at the beginning of the attack and slowly spread out. Akagi and Kaga were close together SE. Soryu was ahead of them NE. Hiryu was on the horizon NE. During the attack the ships individually maneuvered to avoid the American attacks. They could have been heading in any direction when hit. Kaga was engaged in violent maneuvering when hit. Kaga sank at 30 degrees 20 min. N, 179 degrees 17 min. W.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Sunday, 30 July 2000, at 9:43 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Scott Scarborough)

 

To modify my previous statement, after reading other sources on the battle, it is stated that Kaga had stopped her violent maneuvering and started turning into the wind to launch a/c when she was hit by the American dive bombers. So whatever the wind direction (degrees) was on that day, that is the direction she was heading when her engines cut out. At least that is what I believe. Quien Sabe?

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 10:45 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Scott Scarborough)

 

The following editorial comment is not meant to be in any way personnal, so don't take is as such!

Morrison is an idiot, and his account of Midway is so inaccurate as to be considered worthless. If you are going to try to establish any factual data for Midway, you must read for more accurate sources than his - please!

That said, I spent 20 years researching the air actions at Midway before co-authoring the book "A Glorious Page in Our History" which covers much of the air actions, particularly those over Kido Butai, in great detail.

Remembering that the carriers were keeping Z+10 tme (i.e., two hours ahead of Midway time), the wind over Kido Butai and the US carrier Task Forces was from the SE that morning, but by noon (the time of the attacks as recorded at the time by the USN) or, 1000 Midway time as is commonly used, the wind of Kido Butai was from the North.

Kido Butai's Fleet course was 070 degrees to close with the US Carriers throughout most of the "Great CAP", however none of the carriers actually steamed in this direction for any length of time as all were taking evasive action throughout. At 1023 [Midway time] the Fleet course changed to 350 degrees into the wind in preparation to launching the air striking foce. However, at that time, only Akagi & Soryu actually did so, both having just completed long westerly runs to avoid the initial thrust by Torpedo Squadron Three.

To give just the course of Akagi (the Fleet guide):

0917: Fleet course 070, battle speed #3 (24 knots)

0918: VT-8 sighted ahead

0919: Akagi takes evasive action, speed 30

0930: Fleet course 070, speed 12 (regrouping necessary)

0938: VT-6 sighted to SW

0941: Akagi course 320

0958: VT-6 split attacking Kaga

0959: Akagi course 340

1006: VT-6 1st division sighted

1007: Akagi takes evasive action

1010: Akagi course 090

1014: Akagi course 300

1015: VT-3 sighted

1023: Fleet course 350, preparing to launch

In any case, by 1020 Hiryu was coming under attack by Torpedo Squadron Three which had deviated from Soryu, and her course was variable, primarily NE, but she then turned through E to SE by 1035.

Meanwhile, Kaga, whose strike group was not ready for takeoff after the long attack by Torpedo Squadron Six, was still proceeding on the old fleet course of 070 degrees intent on closing the rest of the Fleet until such time as the strike was ready.

Kaga turned to the North into the wind just before the SBDs pushed over, and made a radical turn during the attack. Everyone on the bridge was killed by hit number four (the ninth bomb dropped, and the last recorded by the now overwhelmed crew). There are no indications that I have of when the engines stopped, but it surely was not immediately, as one of the first organized actions taken once someone assumed command was to implement emergency steering, so she must have had way on for some time, though I have no indication of the direction she was steaming. However, it is highly doubtful she was proceeding in a Northerly direction (into the wind), as that would have been the close to the desired course for firefighting efforts and as sterrign was not operational and needed, she probably was not going that way.

Don't know if any of this helps, but ...

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 8:38 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Mark E. Horan)

 

One small quibble here:

"There are no indications that I have of when the engines stopped, but it surely was not immediately, as one of the first organized actions taken once someone assumed command was to implement emergency steering,"

If you reread the report, you will see that Okada gave that emergency steering order BEFORE the loss of the bridge, due to visibility reduction from first bomb hits. Its a minor point, but it means we can't use this clue as proof that Kaga remained under manual steering after the bombing. Otherwise, your summaries of the ships are excellent!

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 8:31 a.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Mark E. Horan)

 

I am really impressed by your reconstruction, and it seems you have taken into account all the clues contained by Akagi being the fleet guide. I have a question: How sure are you about the statement the wind is from the north at 1025?? Don't the pilot reports say it is still generall from the SE? I have read the Bombing 3 report, and the carrier they attack the mention off-hand as turning southerly into the wind. Is their good record of it shifting?

I am not disputing-----a wind from the north would explain some ship positions better than from southeast.

 

Re: VB-3's action report

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Tuesday, 1 August 2000, at 12:02 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Tony Tully)

 

I am assuming (with the usual risks of doing so) that you have read Lt. Shumway's "offical" Action Report written on Enterprise. There is also another "unofficial" Action Report penned by Leslie while on Astoria. This later report is the only one penned by an actual strike leader who was over Kido Butai that morning. (While Gallaher penned VS-6's report, he was following McClusky). None the less, Shumway's is the more informative of the two, given that he had access to the other pilots on the mission, particularly Bottomley, the Flight Officer, and Sherwood, the Second Division leader.

Anyway, without refernce to other sources, if you read Shumway's account, you get a very different picture.

"The Squadron swung northward as the torpedo planes had not yet reported ready for the attack. ... Meanwhile, Bombing Squadron Three commenced its attack with the objective a very large carrier ... Its flight deck was covered with planes spotted aft. Upon sighting our aircraft (sic) the objective turned left 90 degrees to the north in order to launch planes and the sides of the ship turned into a veritable ring of flame ... Diving from the north, all pilots had a steady dive along the fore and aft line of the target."

Leslie notes in his report that "At about 1223 my radioman reported that the carrier which was my target was launching planes. ... I gave the attack signal at about 1225 ..."

Clearly then, the target (Soryu) had turned into the wind prior to the commencement of the attack, and this direction was, in fact, northward, not to the SE.

This is substantiated by the extensive interviews I had with surviving aircrew, as the direction of the sun, wind, target course, and actual attack directions were critical to reconstructing the flight paths of the attacking formations.

By reading the commonly available sources, including Lord's fine book, "Incredible Victory", one would assume that VS-6 and VB-6, arriving from the SW, would have attacked on a SW-NE line. This, however, is not the case. Interviews with McClusky, Gallaher and Best, as well as Penland's official, but unauthorized (he wrote and submittied it without consulting the ill Best or seeking his permission), Bombing Six Action Report establish clearly that the Enterprise SBDs, approaching from the SW, paralleled the IJN formation to the south to obtain a position up sun of the targets before diving (on Kaga) on a SE to NW line.

When Best was cut off in the dive (and this is where Penland's report contains glaring inaccuracies) and opted for the second carrier (Akagi), he hustled over with only his three plane section (Lord's error here was not his fault - he just didn't have access to the right folks) on an easterly course and attacked immediately diving from her port beam on a W to E course, agreeing exactly with Japanese account of three attackers diving from "80 degrees the port" (ship heading 350).

Best noted that she had just turned into the wind and actually launched a zero as he dove (the luckiest SOB on the ship [his quote], PO1c Kimura Korea). Clearly, if Akagi was actually launching aircraft on a course of 350 degrees, that was, in fact, the direction of the wind.

As for Kaga, Penland's diagram of the attack in his report (again in error) notes that Kaga (and Akagi) were proceeding southwesterly when attacked. However, numerous interviews with aircew that attacked her (including Penland himself) agree, in fact, with the Japanese accounts that she turned north (into the wind) just before the attack began. Furthermore, all agreed that the attack was made from the targets starboard side, which would, of course, be impossible to do on a northwesterly dive if the ship was heading SW.

Taken in its entirety, there is little doubt that, by afternoon on the 4th, the direction on the wind in the neighborhood of Kido Butai had changed from the SE to from the N. Further substantiation of a wind change exists in the logs of TF-16, as the ships course during flight operations in the afternoon was very different from the SE couse required on the morning flight operations, though I never recorded the directions (wish I had now though!).

 

Re: More Japanese Data

Posted By: Dan Kaplan <dboykap@aol.com>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 8:59 a.m.

In Response To: Re: VB-3's action report (Mark E. Horan)

 

I have been reading these posts with the greatest of admiration; I too have been long fascinated and mystified with the decisions of the Kido Butai on this day. Clearly, you have all done in incredible amount of detailed research thru available documentation.

For what it's worth, one other fyi regarding course at the time. While clearly a secondary Japanese source, Gakken #14 on the Kido Butai CVs (and other) has a series of diagrams on IJN formations during key CV actions. P. 163 shows the 4 CVs on a N-NW heading, approximately 350 degrees, at the time of the attack. It also indicates 5 SBDs attacking Akagi, 25 SBDs attacking Kaga (both to the north) and 17 SBDs attacking Soryu (though to the SW). Perhaps Tony or Tennessee can translate some of the source material that was used in this representation.

 

Re: More Japanese Data

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 1:53 p.m.

In Response To: Re: More Japanese Data (Dan Kaplan)

 

The data on the US side in the article you cite is obviously based on older information circa Lord or any of the newer books that have failed to pay attention to the detail in Lundstrom's "The First Team", Cressman's "That Gallant Ship", and Cressman & my [the primary authors] "A Glorious Page in Our History."

Lord based is determination on his interviews with Best (B-1) and Bill Roberts (B-5) of Bombing Six, wherein Roberts was adamant that he followed Best in his attack although the two were diametrically opposed in there placement of the island on the target Best (starboard), Roberts (port). Lord determined then, that while the Japanese said three aircraft bombed Akagi, that five must have.

This determination always bothered me greatly, as the Japanese counting was extremely accurate with every US attack force that day, seldom being off at all, and never by more than one if the number was less than 20.

I interviewed at least one member of every single surviving SBD from CV-6, the only exceptions being where both aircrew was killed in the war or afterwards. It was clear from these interviews that Roberts had flown back with the SBDs of the VB-6's third division, including Goldsmith (B-15), and that is why the two ended up on Yorktown together. Considering the two forces dove on different carriers on radically divergent courses, this would have been totally impossible had Roberts not dove on Kaga.

While Best had no idea how many aircraft actually followed him (and he assumed Roberts would have known if he did or not), his gunner, Bill Murray (the Squadron's senior Chief) was adamant that only the squadron's first section continued on to Akagi. In the jumble as they started the dive on Kaga, Roberts section (2 SBDs) had actually formed on Penland's depleted second division (4 SBDs).

The question then became, how could both have been so mistaken in their placement of the island structures. The answer eluded everyone until I had the opportunity to sit with Dick Best and a 1/450 scale model of Akagi. The answer became clear instantly when, standing over the her, Best pointed to the starboard side mounted, downward facing stack structure and said that that is what he had thought was the island, since he was used to large US island structures, and he never actually noticed Akagi's real (but tiny) island at all. This was agreed to by Ed Kroeger (B-2). Likewise, given an accurate top view of Kaga, Roberts agreed that was what he saw.

So, there is little doubt that the Akagi observers were entirely correct that only three aircraft attacked her. Likewise, the aircrew of B-1/B-2 and the Japanese agree that the attack game from W to E. Also, Best's section over flew a TBD formation, "well closed up" during the withdrawal. This was VT-3, heading NE for Hiryu. Best could never have been so far East by that time had is dive been made to the North.

As for Kaga, the Enterprise formation consisted of 31 aircraft by the time McClusky was ready to attack. Three continued on to Akagi. This left 28 to dive on Kaga. Of those, the crews of 11 were lost in the attack (1) or on the way home (10). Of the remaining 17, I interviewed (or had access to an interview) of at least one crew member in 14. They all recalled the direction of the approach, dive, and withdrawal - approaching from the SW, passing S to SE, diving to the NW, withdrawal in a the circular W-SW-S-SE direction around the outside of the Japanese formation.

As to Soryu, the Japanese reported 12-13 SBDs dove on her and that Isokaze and Haruna were each bombed by a pair. VB-3 had 17 SBDs, but only 13 had bombs. Of the 17, five of the last six opted for screening vessels as the carrier was clearly finished, including one unarmed - three (one unarmed) on a CL (Isokaze) and two on a BB (Haruna). This leaves 12 to have attacked Soryu. Of these 12, only nine had bombs. Again, the Japanese counting was very good, and, in fact, agrees with the US aviators attacking her. The VB-3 aircrew I interviewed were adamant that, while the final approach was made on a curving SW course from the N, the dives were made N-S, bow to stern, pointing the SBDs almost right at their chosen rendezvous point to the SE (towards Midway), with no enemy ships in the way. While there is no record of the screens disposition, it is much more likely that the screen would be thin to the SE, where no more carriers were, than to the S or SW in the direction of Akagi and Kaga.

 

Re: More Japanese Data

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Thursday, 3 August 2000, at 3:51 p.m.

In Response To: Re: More Japanese Data (Mark E. Horan)

 

You are so good at reconstructing flight bombing trajectories, is it helpful to know that Japanese sources reveal the near-miss on ISOKAZE is off her starboard quarter, and she is apparently specifically SORYU's plane guard, some 2,000 meters astern? Does that suggest anything?

 

Re: More Japanese Data

Posted By: Dan Kaplan <dboykap@aol.com>

Date: Wednesday, 2 August 2000, at 2:32 p.m.

In Response To: Re: More Japanese Data (Mark E. Horan)

 

Sorry, my error in mistating the diagram desciption. You have clearly done your research; I was merely drawing attention to a Japanese secondary source. What I meant to say was that the diagram shows SBDs attacking Akagi and Kaga from the S-SW to the N-NE for Akagi and to the E-NE for Kaga. The attack on Soryu moves from NE to S-SW. Incidentally, the CVs are positioned heading course 350, Soryu in the 2:00 position, Kaga at 6:00, Akagi between 8 & 9:00, Hiryu at 11:00. No distance between vessels nor weather conditions are apparent. Interestingly, the height of the attacking SBDs is given as 4,000m. Clearly to be taken with a grain of salt.

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 8:24 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Mark E. Horan)

 

The accounts vary as to whether emergency steering was implemented as a result of the forward hits but before Okada et.al. were killed, or whether it was actually after Amagai assumed command. That's one of the things we're trying to straighten out with more research. Either way, as Mark suggests, it seems clear that Kaga was under power for some time after her initial damage, albeit she was probably losing speed as she went until she was just crawling along.

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 4:14 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Mark E. Horan)

 

Mark, please tell us how you really feel about Morrison? Just kidding. I agree with your information. It is more detailed than what I have. However, Nagumo did state that there was a course change to 30 degrees (from 70) prior to the American attack. Have you come across this number in your readings?

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 7:01 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Scott Scarborough)

 

No, no couse of 030 degrees that I am aware of.

Here are all the courses indicated in Nagumo's Battle Report for IJN Akagi (fleet guide) as well as key times after being hit, all converted to Z+12 [Midway] time:

0442: 135

0631: 140

0739: 100

0749: 120

0754: 150

0810: 140

0820: 270

0845: 160

0848: 120

0855: 090

0917: 070

0928: 115

0938: 300

0941: 320

0959: 340

1010: 090

1023: 350

1026: Akagi hit

1029: induced explosions begin

1042: engines ordered shut down

1046: Nagumo transfers to Nowaki

1057: 080

1127: stopped

1130: air personnel begin transferring to DDs

1203: engines start on their own, ship begins circling to starboard

1338: emperor's portrait removed

1350: stopped

1925: prepare to abandon

2000: commence abandonment

0200: ship scuttled at 30.30N, 178.40W

Notes on other carriers:

Kaga:

1325: emperor's portrait removed

1640: situation hopeless

1925: two great explosions from the fore AND AFT fuel tanks tear the ship apart and Kaga sinks at 30.20.3N, 179.17.2W (also reported at 30.23.3N, 179.17.2W)

Soryu:

1025: 1st hit

1026: 2nd hit

1028: 3rd hit

1030: secondary explosions commence

1040: engines stop

1043: ship helpless, steering gone

1045: abondon ship ordered

1913: ship sank at 32.42.5N, 178.37.5W

1920: tremendous underwater explosion

Hiryu:

1703: bombed

2358: serious secondary explosion dooms ship

0230: prepare to abandon ship

0415: abandon ship

0430: emperor's portrait removed

0510: scuttled by torpedo at 31.27.5N, 179.23.5W, although the ship did not actually sink here of even at this time as we all know

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Scott Scarborough <crusader117@juno.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 7:50 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Mark E. Horan)

 

Thanks, I got my info from older books like "Midway! Incredible Victory" by Walter Lord. Even though dated, still a good read. As far as sinking locations, that is always conjecture. I have the book entitled "Warships of the Imperial Japanese Navy" by Jentschura, Jung and Mickel. They state that the Akagi sinking location was 30 degrees, 30 min. N, 179 degrees 08 min. W. Walter Lord places it at 30 degrees 30 min. N, 178 degrees 40 min. W. Who knows?

 

Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s)

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Monday, 31 July 2000, at 8:20 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kido Butai's (and Kaga's) course(s) (Scott Scarborough)

 

You can throw all those published sinking positions, is my guess. I know for a fact that The Chunk from Kaga that Nuaticos located ain't anywhere near her printed sinking posit., and all the indications are that the main wreck should be within a couple miles of that location, *if* she was no longer under power. The other three carriers are likely just as inaccurate.

 

Re: Kaga Find

Posted By: Tony Tully <atully@flash.net>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 7:34 p.m.

In Response To: Re: Kaga Find (Randy)

 

The best indication for Kaga's heading when power failed would put her broadside to the wind from the SE. But we don't know when her propulsion kicked out. Soryu's failed fifteen minutes after being hit. No doubt about it, other than the fact that we have some general factors to go on, the search may take a little while before finding the main wreck. My own guess is the best way would be to do elaborate mathematical models of drift like Titanic's. These could provide a frame of probability using the chunk as a datum point.

 

Re: unlikely

Posted By: Mark E. Horan <mhoran@snet.net>

Date: Thursday, 27 July 2000, at 10:23 a.m.

In Response To: Kaga Find (Steve Athanas)

 

I would doubt very much that a bomb hit, of any type, would have separated such a large sectiuon of hull from a ship. It is much more likely that the hull was blown apart much later by one of the many internal explosions as fuel and ordnace were cooked off by the extant fires.

 

Re: unlikely

Posted By: Randy <r.stone.eal@juno.com>

Date: Thursday, 27 July 2000, at 6:43 p.m.

In Response To: Re: unlikely (Mark E. Horan)

 

But this section is likely of superstructure rather than hull. Could then a bomb be considered? But I still agree with you that subsequent and sympathetic detonations were more likely the cause.

 

Re: unlikely

Posted By: Jon Parshall <jonp@combinedfleet.com>

Date: Friday, 28 July 2000, at 12:47 p.m.

In Response To: Re: unlikely (Randy)

 

As you might imagine, I've been enjoying this thread a *lot*! Everything we've seen of the artifact to date suggests that it was subsequent induced explosions that blew the chunk overboard, and not the initial hit. My contacts on the Marine Forensics Panel are all saying that a 500lb GP just wouldn't do that. My personal guess is that the induced explosion that blew it overboard probably happened within the first 1-3 hours of her ordeal--it takes a while for the bombs and torpedoes to roast, but they will all be expended within a few hours. That leaves her another 6-8 hours of drift before she sank. I can tell you that the main wreck is not in the immediate vicinity of the artifact, and that the artifact itself is nowhere the published locations of her sinking. I myself don't know the exact Lat./Long. of the artifact (I've honestly never seen it marked on a map), and couldn't say anything even if I did, of course. However, given that Nauticos now has an accurate point to start the next phase of the search, they tell me it should be fairly easy to find her. The search area has been knocked down a great deal by this discovery.

 

Re: unlikely